Individual and strategic behaviors in a dynamic extraction problem: results from a within-subject experiment in continuous time

M. Djiguemde, D. Dubois, Alexandre Sauquet and M. Tidball

Applied Economics, 2023, vol. 55, issue 39, 4539-4562

Abstract: We conduct a laboratory experiment to test a continuous-time model that represents a dynamic groundwater extraction problem in an infinite horizon. We compare the observations to the equilibrium path of the usual behaviours, for the case where the player is alone in extracting the resource (optimal control) and when two players extract the same resource simultaneously (differential game). We use a within-subjects design. This allows us to identify individual profiles of players playing alone and then characterize groups based on their composition with respect to these individual behaviours. We find that approximately a quarter of the players and groups succeed in playing (significantly) optimally, and none behave myopically. Moreover having an agent that behaved optimally in the control in the pair increases the likelihood that the group cooperates. We also identify other categories of players and groups that allows us to classify an additional 50% of the observations.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2022.2129576 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Individual and strategic behaviors in a dynamic extraction problem: results from a within-subject experiment in continuous time (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:55:y:2023:i:39:p:4539-4562

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2022.2129576

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().