From Cartel Regulation to Monopolistic Control? The Founding of the German 'Steel Trust' in 1926 and its Effect on Market Regulation

Alfred Reckendrees ()

Business History, 2003, vol. 45, issue 3, 22-51

Abstract: The foundation of the Vereinigte Stahlwerke AG, the merger of four leading steel combines, changed the inter-company system of the cartelised German steel industry. In 1926, this cartel system was no longer a sufficient framework to solve the economic problems of the steel combines. Still, merger did not mean 'abandoning cartels' as contemporaries assumed, it rather was a strategy to overcome limits of the cartel system. The article analyses the founding of the German 'Steel Trust' and examines its effects on the cartel system. The new large company utilised the institutional arrangements of the cartels, and it reached predominance within the oligopoly of steel combines and within the steel cartels. These were, as an evaluation of price data indicates, at least until after 1932 economically not as strong as their steady persistence suggests. At the same time, the company prepared itself to live without cartels and developed a company structure that allowed for a flexible response to any development in the cartels and on the markets.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999324 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:bushst:v:45:y:2003:i:3:p:22-51

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/FBSH20

DOI: 10.1080/713999324

Access Statistics for this article

Business History is currently edited by Professor John Wilson and Professor Steven Toms

More articles in Business History from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().