Evading labour market regulations to preserve team performance: evidence from the Victorian Football League, 1930–70

Luc Borrowman, Lionel Frost, Abdel K Halabi and Peter Schuwalow

Business History, 2020, vol. 62, issue 8, 1303-1323

Abstract: Sports teams that seek to maximise the number of wins, rather than profits, may not comply with league labour market regulations that compress payroll structures to promote even competition. This strategic behaviour depends on others, as teams choose a strategy to create team incentives, to which rivals will respond. A case study of four teams in a semi-professional Australian Rules football league tests the effectiveness of strategies to evade these regulations on winning percentages. Both compliance and non-compliance within this labour market regulation regime, based on different wage structures and talent distribution, were effective strategies to improve team performance.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2018.1531850

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