Insights into the nature and dynamics of business power: The case of Credit Unions in 1960s Argentina

Andrés Spognardi

Business History, 2024, vol. 66, issue 7, 1758-1784

Abstract: Most analyses of business power focus on the ability of firms to mobilise resources to influence policy or regulation. When examined through this lens, however, the case of Argentine Credit Unions (CUs) seems puzzling. Emerging from the margins of the economy, CUs withstood regulatory pressures from politically-connected banks, building an informal nationwide credit network with its own payment instruments and clearing services. A military dictatorship eventually restricted their informal operations, but subsequently granted them the right to offer services that had been hitherto monopolised by commercial banks. To explain this outcome, this article draws on a broader definition of power. Businesses’ ability to influence policy and regulation not only stems from their capacity to mobilise resources (instrumental power) but also from the socioeconomic impact of their activity (structural power). Argentine CUs’ endeavour shows that both dimensions of power are closely intertwined and highly dependent on contingent contextual factors.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2023.2202910

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