Outsourcing national defense: an impediment to the US strategy of great power competition

Thomas Bruneau

Defense & Security Analysis, 2024, vol. 40, issue 1, 60-79

Abstract: My goals in this paper are to elaborate further an approach to civil-military relations going beyond control to include effectiveness; and, to argue that outsourcing by the Department of Defense (DoD) results in opportunity costs making very difficult the implementation of the national security strategy of “great power competition.” The current acquisition authority for outsourcing impedes DoD accessing cutting-edge technology generated by “startups.” In an earlier era of strategic competition, the main US response was to create the National Aeronautics and Space Agency with a new acquisition authority – “other transaction authority” (OTA). In the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2018 Congress stipulated that OTAs should be the preference for DoD in science and technology and prototyping, and education in OTAs be provided. This education has not been implemented. Consequently, a key element of the US great power competition strategy, which is the acquisition of new technology, goes wanting.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/14751798.2024.2285139

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