Consensus Politics in Germany Versus Adversary Politics in the United Kingdom? An Evaluation of the German and the Westminster Model of Democracy on the Basis of the Veto Players Theory

Gerd Strohmeier

Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe, 2006, vol. 14, issue 3, 229-245

Abstract: The contribution evaluates the German and the Westminster Model of democracy on the basis of the veto players theory. Both the German Model (a democracy with many veto players) and the Westminster Model (a democracy with a minimum of veto players) imply perceived theoretical advantages and disadvantages. However, it is argued that the perceived theoretical disadvantage of the Westminster Model as well as the perceived theoretical advantage of the German Model barely manifest themselves in reality. Therefore it is recommended not to increase the number of veto players in the UK and to reduce the number of veto players in Germany.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/09651560601042902

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