The failures of horizontal accountability at the subnational level: a perspective from the Global South
Gustavo Andrey de Almeida Lopes Fernandes,
Marco Antonio Carvalho Teixeira,
Ivan Filipe de Almeida Lopes Fernandes and
Fabiano Angélico
Development in Practice, 2020, vol. 30, issue 5, 687-693
Abstract:
In new democracies, horizontal accountability tends to be more fragile than vertical since authoritarian institutional legacies are more difficult to transform than organising free and fair elections. These barriers to full democratisation are stronger at subnational levels, where local old authoritarian elites are better able to hold institutional power and block transformations. This viewpoint presents data from Brazil, one of the strongest democracies of the Global South. After three decades of free elections, the design of oversight institutions of Brazilian subnational governments has hardly changed from dictatorial periods, leading to administrative practices and routines that undermine the transparency of monitoring and assessing public policy. Using institutional and behavioural measures of transparency, it shows that there are important bottlenecks to adequate accountability in Brazil.
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09614524.2020.1773764 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:cdipxx:v:30:y:2020:i:5:p:687-693
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/cdip20
DOI: 10.1080/09614524.2020.1773764
Access Statistics for this article
Development in Practice is currently edited by Emily Finlay
More articles in Development in Practice from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().