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Why didn’t Europe securitise more? The institutionalisation of covered bonds as an efficient instrument for financialisation

Viktor Skyrman

New Political Economy, 2024, vol. 29, issue 1, 144-158

Abstract: This article analyses an overlooked financial instrument in political economy, despite its institutionalisation having immense ramifications for European financial markets: the covered bond. Following decades of cross-continental bank lobbying led by German mortgage banks, covered bonds transformed from a ‘little-understood corner of the German bond market’ in the mid-1990s into a global multi-trillion dollar market in the years prior to the Global Financial Crisis. This article highlights that covered bonds, on the one hand, stabilise and de-risk financialised capitalism by providing credit institutions with a stable means of bank financing and collateral while providing investors with safe investment opportunities, including during periods of crisis. In addition, the expansion of covered bond markets has marginalised mortgage securitisation in much of Europe. On the other hand, covered bonds fuel household indebtedness by increasing the credit supply available for mortgage lending, which is the primary activity of contemporary banking in general and covered bond issuers in particular. The instrument can therefore be perceived as a more simple, stable and efficient instrument for household financialisation compared to the more crisis-prone residential mortgage-backed derivative.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2023.2230545

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