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‘Saving the WTO’: middle power insiders and joint statement initiatives at the World Trade Organisation

Shamel Azmeh

New Political Economy, 2024, vol. 29, issue 1, 60-74

Abstract: Studies have argued that gridlock in the multilateral trade regime has contributed to processes of regime shifting and creation through the expansion of regional and bilateral agreements. Scholars have long debated the impact of such agreements on the multilateral regime exploring their effect on the incentives of insiders, countries that have signed such agreements, and outsiders, countries that are excluded from such agreements. Based on interviews with officials from sixty member states at the World Trade Organisation, this paper examines this issue by analysing the behaviour of insiders and outsiders in the multilateral trade regime. While analysis of trade and investment diversion might lead us to predict that outsiders will have a stronger interest in the multilateral regime, I find that insiders, particularly middle powers, are key drivers of attempts to end the stalemate in the World Trade Organisation by championing what became known as Joint Statement Initiatives. I explain this position by the systemic support of middle powers to the multilateral regime and by the shift in trade governance towards deep integration issues in which discrimination against outsiders is infeasible or costly.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2023.2221637

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