State autonomy, economic reform & business elite influence in the GCC
Dania Thafer
New Political Economy, 2024, vol. 29, issue 4, 532-545
Abstract:
This study challenges traditional rentier state theory and contributes to a new generation of scholarship focused on state-business relations by evaluating the relationship between different degrees of state policymaking autonomy and business elite influences in political and economic institutions. The findings of this study address central policy questions about economic reform in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries. Using primary data from my case studies of Qatar and Kuwait, I posit two arguments. First, states with lesser business elite influence over political institutions have more autonomy to realise their economic reform goals; a less dominant and influential business elite circle will more likely submit to state-led economic reform initiatives. Greater business elite dominance, meanwhile, tends to create a powerful bloc undercutting economic change, such as labour reform or new regulatory frameworks, that would benefit the long-term stability of the state. Second, rentier states with higher degrees of state-led capitalism have more autonomy to conduct economic reforms; state-led capitalism produces more coherent and cohesive state apparatuses that can incentivize business elite cooperation.
Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:29:y:2024:i:4:p:532-545
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2023.2298196
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