Rethinking predation under financialisation through the history of subprime mortgages: a case of raiding finance

Pasquale Emanuele De Girolamo

New Political Economy, 2025, vol. 30, issue 2, 300-312

Abstract: The ‘rentier’ model provides an influential framework for conceptualising the predatory traits of financialisation. It asserts that financialisation has empowered a class of rentiers who wield influence by controlling scarce money and charging others for its use. The development of subprime mortgages is often cited as a prime example of rentier exploitation, wherein banks capitalised on historically marginalised borrowers. This article revisits this history to argue that predation under financialisation has historically deviated from rentierisation. Specifically, subprime mortgages were not developed by entities fitting the rentier model, but rather by real estate actors operating outside the established financial system. The latter developed predatory capabilities by virtue of their ability to secure substantial funds through debt, thus reducing reliance on their own capital. This led to the creation of subprime mortgages, loans focused on home-equity stripping, which were crucial to sustain their funding model. Building on these insights, this study introduces the concept of ‘raiding’ as a form of predation that emphasises practices centred on the rapid extraction of money, alongside more traditional forms of rentierism.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2024.2434482

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