Experiences of running negotiable and non-negotiable developer contributions side-by-side

Pete Wyatt

Planning Practice & Research, 2017, vol. 32, issue 2, 152-170

Abstract: In England, Since the 1970s, a system of negotiated project-specific agreements between local planning authorities and developers/landowners has evolved into the sole mechanism by which part of land value uplift ‘released’ by the grant of planning permission is captured by government. In 2010, in an attempt to simplify and speed up the planning process – negotiated planning agreements were regarded as time-consuming and a brake on development – the Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) was introduced. Originally intended as a simple flat rate charge to replace site-specific planning agreements, CIL now sits alongside that mechanism so that developers pay CIL to help fund infrastructure provision in the locality, whilst planning agreements help mitigate the impact of their development and provide affordable housing. The experience of running a system of negotiated planning agreements alongside a non-negotiable infrastructure levy offers an opportunity to evaluate these policy shifts in order to assess their strengths and weaknesses and whether there are any wider lessons for international discussions of best practice in land value capture. Drawing on survey findings the paper considers the implementation of CIL alongside planning agreements, the revenue and expenditure patterns, and the impact of these combined land value capture mechanisms on development activity and, in particular, on affordable housing supply.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/02697459.2016.1222148

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