Aid sanctions and constitutional order: the US and France’s responses to military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rise of multipolar competition

Inesta Brunel Lendzoumbou

Third World Quarterly, 2025, vol. 46, issue 9, 987-1012

Abstract: The resurgence of military coups in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) underscores the diminishing effectiveness of aid sanctions as mechanisms for restoring constitutional order. This article develops a power-­competition framework to examine how sanctions operate within the intersecting pressures of domestic politics, regional enforcement, and geopolitical dynamics. Drawing on an original dataset of 35 coups across 19 SSA states (1990–2023) and case studies of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, it argues that sanctions’ impact depends on three key factors: (1) the junta’s ability to maintain elite cohesion and public legitimacy, (2) the degree of alignment between Western donors and regional organisations, and (3) the availability of alternative external support, particularly from China and Russia. While the US enforces sanctions more consistently (83% of cases), France’s selective application (40%) reflects how strategic interests often override democratic conditionality. Sanctions are most effective when domestic opposition aligns with regional enforcement and when geopolitical alternatives are limited. Conversely, they fail when juntas exploit donor fragmentation or secure Russian military backing and Chinese economic partnerships. These findings illustrate how great power competition and inconsistent anti-coup enforcement shape the strategic calculations of military regimes, ultimately undermining democracy promotion in a multipolar order.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/01436597.2025.2526063 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ctwqxx:v:46:y:2025:i:9:p:987-1012

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/ctwq20

DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2025.2526063

Access Statistics for this article

Third World Quarterly is currently edited by Shahid Qadir

More articles in Third World Quarterly from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().