Rational deterrence by proxy: designing cooperative security agreements

Catherine C. Langlois and Jean-Pierre P. Langlois

Defence and Peace Economics, 2017, vol. 28, issue 1, 1-33

Abstract: President Obama’s call for change in the conduct of US foreign policy shifts emphasis from direct interventions to cooperative partnerships. With a $5$ \$5 $ billion pledge as support for their development, the issue of effectiveness and design is brought to the fore. If terror organizations cannot be eradicated, can a donor state successfully delegate the deterrence or at least the containment of a violent non-state actor to the host country from which it operates? We identify, assess for impact, and value rational delegated deterrence arrangements, in which the US subsidizes a host, and the host, with agreed upon vigor, inhibits the activity of the violent non-state actor operating within its borders. We account for the US’ imperfect monitoring of host and non-state actor activity and identify agreements that can successfully deter the targeted organizations. We also find that mutually agreeable weak cooperation between donor and host can endure despite the survival of the violent non-state actor on host territory.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1118943

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