Do scarce resource inputs promote or reduce patent values and innovation? A game theory approach

Pu-yan Nie, Han-geng Qiu, Hong-xing Wen and Chan Wang

Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 2025, vol. 34, issue 6, 920-937

Abstract: Both patent price and innovation play crucial roles in the patent market and this article studies patent values under capacity or resource constraints using a game theory approach. First, patent industrialization advances consumer surplus in all situations. Second, under a monopoly, there is an inverse U-shaped relationship between the patent value and the total amount of a resource. Third, under an oligopoly with nonbinding capacity constraints, the patent value decreases as the total amount of the resource increases. Finally, the overall relationship between the patent value and the total amount of the resource under an oligopoly also has an inverse U-shape.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2024.2388211

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