Intertemporal aggregation and incentives

Anil Arya (), Jonathan Glover and Pierre Jinghong Liang

European Accounting Review, 2004, vol. 13, issue 4, 643-657

Abstract: Intertemporal aggregation results in a summarization of information and a natural delay in the release of information. We study a principal-agent model and show that intertemporal aggregation can be an optimal feature of a performance evaluation system. We then highlight subtleties associated with valuing additional information as the level of aggregation of existing information is varied.

Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1080/0963818042000216857

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