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Female Directors in Play Keep Short-Sellers Away

Anisur Rahman and Nilesh B. Sah

European Accounting Review, 2024, vol. 33, issue 2, 489-518

Abstract: Multiple media reports and academic studies have indicated several benefits of having a gender-diverse board. However, corporate boards still lack female representation. Considering this gender imbalance, we examine the relation between short-selling and gender diversity on corporate boards and explain the underlying mechanism. We find strong evidence that increased female representation on corporate boards deters short-sellers because female directors improve the information environment for their firms. Female directors enhance corporate governance and play a vital role as effective monitors of firms. Our results are especially relevant in the post-Regulation FD period suggesting that female directors work as enforcers of regulations for their firms. Therefore, it would be astute to increase female representation on corporate boards as it would serve the interests of managers, regulators, and shareholders.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2103012

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