The Spillover of U.S. Regulatory Oversight to Foreign Markets: Evidence from the Effect of PCAOB International Inspections on Executive Compensations

Chang He, Lixin (Nancy) Su, Zheng Wang and Xindong (Kevin) Zhu

European Accounting Review, 2025, vol. 34, issue 1, 397-426

Abstract: We examine the spillover effect of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) international inspection program on improving the contracting role of accounting numbers in executive compensations in an international setting. For a sample of non-U.S.-listed foreign public firms with PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors, we find a significant increase in the sensitivity of their executive cash compensations to earnings after the release of the first inspection reports on their auditors by the PCAOB, relative to those without PCAOB-inspected foreign auditors. Such a result suggests that the compensation committees of firms with PCAOB-inspected auditors infer that the quality of earnings as a performance measure for determining executive compensations improves due to the PCAOB’s inspections of their auditors. We also find that a clean inspection report issued to the firm’s auditor has an incremental effect on increasing earnings pay-for-performance sensitivity. Our findings provide novel evidence on the effectiveness of U.S. regulatory oversight in foreign markets and should interest the PCAOB and local audit regulators around the world.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2252022

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