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Women’s Bargaining Power and Children’s Nutritional Status: Evidence from Indonesia

Romi Hartarto (), Claudia Aravena and Arnab Bhattacharjee

Feminist Economics, 2025, vol. 31, issue 2, 155-185

Abstract: Child stunting is a serious challenge in Indonesia, one of the largest middle-income countries in the world. Beyond the influence of bio-behavioral determinants, mothers’ bargaining power in the household is expected to have an overarching contribution to stunting, particularly as the primary caregivers of their children. Using a dataset from the fifth wave of the Indonesia Family Life Survey (IFLS-5), this study examines whether and to what extent a mother’s bargaining power influences children’s nutritional status. The study uses the instrumental variables method to correct the potential endogeneity of the mother’s bargaining power. Results suggest that children of mothers with higher intrahousehold bargaining power have a lower prevalence of stunting and better anthropometric outcomes. However, other members of the household matter, in the sense that improved outcomes are evidenced when the mother exercises her choice in decision making in a more consensual manner, by consultation with other household members.HIGHLIGHTSIn Indonesia, higher women’s bargaining power enhances child nutritional long-term outcomes.Child nutrition improves when women make decisions jointly with other family members.Boys appear to be the main beneficiaries of mothers’ higher bargaining power.Policies to increase women’s agency need to consider family support and social norms.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13545701.2024.2383207

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