Does Clausewitz Apply to Criminal-States and Gangs?

Mark T. Clark

Global Crime, 2006, vol. 7, issue 3-4, 407-427

Abstract: Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers present unique problems for contemporary international political theory. This essay examines the applicability of the theory of war developed by Carl von Clausewitz to Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers. As modified by Aristotle's idea of justice as the basis for the political community, this essay proposes that Clausewitz's famous connection between politics and war holds where such states and soldiers evince political behavior. Some contrasting implications for states and state leaders are examined when such entities evince — and do not evince — political behavior.

Date: 2006
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DOI: 10.1080/17440570601087707

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