Welfare reform: A game theoretic perspective

Kathy Dean and Kevin Christ

Forum for Social Economics, 1998, vol. 28, issue 1, 45-60

Abstract: Traditionally, the debate over welfare reform has been infused with passion and driven by ideology, but reform itself has proceeded in careful steps. In recent years, however, the status quo has been dramatically altered as the need for fundamental change has become apparent as the starting point for reform. Using the state of Wisconsin’s aggressive approach to welfare reform as a model of what is administratively possible, we portray reform as an n-person iterated coordination game in order to examine potential outcomes under the larger rubric of ratinal decision-making and utility maximization. In so doing, we demonstrate that game theory offers an alternative framework for dissecting and discussing complex social issues such as welfare reform.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02746416

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