The Role of Political Exclusion and State Capacity in Civil Conflict in South Asia

Sambuddha Ghatak

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2018, vol. 30, issue 1, 74-96

Abstract: Extant literature on intrastate conflict independently explores terrorism and civil war. However, both terrorism and civil war are probably parts of a continuum of intrastate conflict with the former at one end and the latter at the other end in terms of intensity. I argue that two factors play important roles in rebels’ decision-making calculus, namely, the size of their support base and state strength. Terrorism, as a strategy of the weak, is optimal when the rebel groups have little support among their audience and the state is strong. On the other hand, guerrilla warfare is an ideal strategy when such groups have a greater support base and the state is weak. The theoretical argument is tested on a dataset of Myanmar and six countries of South Asia and for 1970–2007.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2016.1150840

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