Violence on the Home Front: Interstate Rivalry and Pro-Government Militias

Harrison Akins

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2021, vol. 33, issue 3, 466-488

Abstract: With an increased focus on the role of pro-government militias in understanding intra-state conflict, scholars have primarily argued that states use militias as a proxy of the government because of low capacity or as a means of avoiding responsibility for violence against civilians. However, states with both high capacity and a willingness to commit violence against civilians have also relied upon pro-government militias in counterinsurgency operations. This paper argues that states involved in enduring interstate rivalries are more likely to use pro-government militias in order to reserve conventional military forces for potential conflict with their rival. Based on a case study of India’s Kashmir insurgency and logit analysis of pro-government militia data from 1981 to 2001, the findings provide empirical support for this theory and are robust to alternative measures and model specifications.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2018.1548353

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