Classical deterrence theory: A critical assessment
Frank C. Zagare
International Interactions, 1995, vol. 21, issue 4, 365-387
Abstract:
This essay summarizes and critically evaluates the conceptual underpinnings of Classical (or Rational) Deterrence Theory. The paradigm's origins are traced to Realist political thought and balance of power politics. Two distinct, yet compatible, strands of the theory are identified: Structural Deterrence and Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory. Structural (or Neorealist) Deterrence Theory sees the key to international stability in the distribution of power within the system in general, and among the great powers in particular. By contrast, Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory focuses upon the interplay of outcomes, preferences and rational choices in determining interstate conflict behavior. The critical deductions of both strands of the theory are at odds with the empirical record and each is hard put to explain the stability of the post—war period. As well, mainstream Decision‐Theoretic Deterrence Theory is logically inconsistent. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of some potential responses to the theory's inadequacies.
Date: 1995
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:21:y:1995:i:4:p:365-387
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629608434873
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