Democracy and trade conflict*

Richard Sherman

International Interactions, 1999, vol. 27, issue 1, 1-28

Abstract: The record of formal disputes in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is largely one of conflict among democracies. I develop a theoretical argument to explain the prevalence of democratic states in the GATT's dispute process. Democracies face stronger pressures to initiate disputes; they are more attractive as dispute targets due to the political influence enjoyed by interest groups; they share norms of juridical dispute resolution; and they are more likely to uphold their policy commitments than nondemocracies. I develop an empirical model of the incidence of disputes among GATT members, finding that democracies are more likely to participate in disputes than nondemocratic states. I also find that democratic dyads are more likely to resolve their disputes cooperatively.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434975

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