Rules of military retaliation and their practice by the state of Israel

Ranan D. Kuperman

International Interactions, 2001, vol. 27, issue 3, 297-326

Abstract: A major issue intriguing students of international relations is determining to what extent, if at all, do norms and standard operating procedures (SOPs) affect foreign policy. This question is addressed in this article in the case of Israel's policy of military retaliation. Alternative rules of conduct associated with this policy were deduced from strategic and normative arguments presented by Israeli decision‐makers in order to justify military reprisal attacks against Arab countries. These rules of conduct were then formulized into hypotheses and empirically tested with the aid of a database that contained daily accounts of Arab and Israeli acts of aggression towards each other between 1949 and 1982. In this manner it was possible to identify different decision rules that dominated Israel's reprisal policy at different periods of time.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434987

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