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The effects of uncertainty and sex in a crisis simulation game

Rose McDermott and Jonathan A. Cowden

International Interactions, 2001, vol. 27, issue 4, 353-380

Abstract: We conducted an experimental test of spiraling behavior, sex differences, and uncertainty in a simulated crisis situation. We investigated the relationship between weapons acquisition and the likelihood of engaging in aggressive behavior, such as going to war. The sample included 100 male and female subjects who participated in a crisis simulation in same‐sex dyads; each student was instructed to role play the leader of a country in conflict with another leader over a nearby island replete with newly discovered oil resources. Participants were randomly assigned to stimulus materials that manipulated the certainty of the information they received about their partner's force structure. In four cycles of decision‐making, each participant made procurement decisions, took an action related to the conflict, including decisions about going to war, completed questionnaires on characteristics such as the hostility and trustworthiness of themselves and their opponents, and wrote messages to the other member of the pair. The results of the study demonstrate a strong relationship between weapons acquisition and hostility. In addition, we found large and robust sex differences, showing that men are much more likely than women to acquire weapons and engage in aggressive behavior at every stage. There was no effect of uncertainty on either arms procurement or aggression.

Date: 2001
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620108434990

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