Asymmetric Proliferation and Nuclear War: The Limited Usefulness of an Experimental Test

Michael Simon

International Interactions, 2004, vol. 30, issue 1, 69-85

Abstract: I employ a human subject experiment to assess the relationship between nuclear proliferation and war. I develop a game-theoretic model to predict crisis behavior following four scenarios of dyadic nuclear acquisition. By varying the cash payments allotted to different outcomes, I experimentally alter the payoffs of the participants. Subjects compete for cash payments by playing a competitive game based on the model. The experimental variation (altering the cash payments) allows for an exploration of the difference between nuclear armament scenarios. Tentative results suggest that asymmetric nuclear acquisition would be dangerous. Yet, serious limits exist to the generalizability of experiments on nuclear proliferation, due to the gap between the laboratory setting and actual nuclear decision-making.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/725289043

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