Critical Periods and Regime Type: Integrating Power Cycle Theory with the Democratic Peace Hypothesis

Brock F. Tessman

International Interactions, 2005, vol. 31, issue 3, 223-249

Abstract: The absence of war among leading states compels scholars such as John Mueller (1989) to speculate on the obsolescence of major power conflict. Robert Jervis (2002) outlines the challenge that a democratic major power security community presents to existing theories of war. Can any existing theory of war explain conflict in a major power system dominated by democracies? This article integrates the power cycle theory of war with the democratic peace hypothesis in order to show that, although critical periods consistently lead to major power war, democratic states are less affected by these periods than are their nondemocratic counterparts. Using Correlates of War, deterrence, Polity and national capability data from 1816--1995, empirical tests show that — for all major powers — the probability of conflict participation and initiation is higher during critical periods than remaining years. Importantly, however, this difference is statistically significant for nondemocracies, while it is not so for democracies. This paper argues that structural components of democratic government are largely responsible for any immunity that democracies enjoy with regard to the potential maladies associated with critical periods. Brock F. Tessman is a Lecturer at the University of Denver, Graduate School of International Studies. He received his Ph.D. in December, 2004, from the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620500294192

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