 Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute DataDon Moon International Interactions, 2006, vol. 32, issue 3, 201-228 Abstract: This article explores the distributive aspects of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) of the World Trade Organization WTO. Even though the strictly binding dispute settlement (DS) system can operate in an unbiased way and thereby minimize power disparity among disputants, in general, the content of law on which the whole DS system is based is favorable to developed countries in the system. This study of the WTO DSM demonstrates that (1) the procedural/substantive dispute outcomes of the WTO are not significantly affected by power disparity between disputants (thus, enhancing the principles of “equality before the law” and “protecting the weak”), but that (2) the strict substantive provisions and the newly included provisions of the WTO agreements are advantageous to developed countries and disadvantageous to developing countries (thus, increased inequality in the content of the law). In order to understand the distributive consequences of the legal DSM, we need to combine an analysis of the operation of the legal body with an examination of the content of the law. Date: 2006 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:32:y:2006:i:3:p:201-228 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/03050620600837841 Access Statistics for this article International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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