Cantankerous Cooperation: Democracies, Authoritarian Regimes, and the Prisoner's Dilemma

Joseph Young and Brian Urlacher

International Interactions, 2007, vol. 33, issue 1, 51-73

Abstract: One of the most important debates in the field of international relations is over the effect of regime type on militarized conflict. This debate, however, has rarely extended to how regime type influences other aspects of foreign policy. Using a computer simulated intergroup prisoner's dilemma, we investigate whether democratic decisionmaking groups are more cooperative than authoritarian decisionmaking groups. We argue that differences between cooperation tendencies of groups can be explained by the structure of the decision process. Repeated simulations show that democracies tend to be more consistent in their decisions in comparison to authoritarian groups. Implications for international relations theory and policy are discussed.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620601155649

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