Toward a Unified Theory of Interstate Conflict

Frank C. Zagare

International Interactions, 2007, vol. 33, issue 3, 305-327

Abstract: This article seeks to refine the power transition proposition, thereby reducing its permissiveness, by linking it to an axiomatically compatible theory of interstate conflict initiation called perfect deterrence theory. The similarities between the two frameworks are discussed, as are several significant conceptual and terminological differences. The broad conclusions and policy implications of power transition and perfect deterrence theory are shown to be the same. But perfect deterrence theory is much more precise about the conditions associated with the onset, escalation, and resolution of interstate conflict than is power transition theory. These conditions are summarized and discussed; the extensive empirical support for perfect deterrence theory's principal deductions is also reviewed.

Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.1080/03050620701451153

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