Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War

Stephen E. Gent

International Interactions, 2009, vol. 35, issue 1, 1-29

Abstract: Proponents of the diversionary theory of war have often argued that domestic reselection incentives induce office-seeking leaders to pursue aggressive foreign policies. To examine the relationship between strategic interaction and diversionary incentives, this article develops a two-state, two-sided incomplete information deterrence model with domestic reselection. According to the model, reselection mechanisms increase a leader's propensity to pursue aggressive foreign policies. Diversionary incentives in attacking states lead to an increase in war outcomes, while diversionary incentives in defending states may or may not increase the probability of war. The model also predicts that there will be nonmonotonic relationships between economic performance and war and between regime type and diversionary behavior, which may explain the discrepancies among many empirical tests of diversionary theory.

Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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DOI: 10.1080/03050620802497048

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