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Jumping into the Fray: Alliances, Power, Institutions, and the Timing of Conflict Expansion

Molly M. Melin and Michael T. Koch

International Interactions, 2010, vol. 36, issue 1, 1-27

Abstract: Our paper examines the question of when conflicts expand and what leads particular states to join more quickly than others. Using factors highlighted in the conflict expansion and joining literatures, we derive hypotheses about how these factors make resolve in the face of credible threats more likely and how this either increases or decreases the time to conflict expansion. We also generate expectations about when specific states are likely to join a conflict. We test our expectations using a dataset of the initial belligerents of militarized disputes and all potential joiner states. The results of our analyses suggest that conflict expansion is more often because of initiators' resolve rather than miscalculation since observable signals of likely expansion, such as alliances and power, decrease the time to expansion. Our findings have important implications for research on alliance reliability, balancing and bandwaggoning, and various proposed causes of the democratic peace.

Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1080/03050620903328696

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