Capitalism, Commitment, and Peace

Patrick J. McDonald

International Interactions, 2010, vol. 36, issue 2, 146-168

Abstract: This paper builds on the growing capitalist peace research program by examining how large quantities of public property influence the likelihood of conflict between states. Drawing on the logic of the commitment problem, it develops two explanations linking the predominance of public property in an economy to the likelihood of being the target of military conflict, defined to include both militarized disputes and war. Empirical support for this hypothesis is generated with a brief illustrative case and a series of statistical tests with monadic and directed dyadic research designs. A final section discusses how these findings suggest that capitalism plays a larger role than democracy in limiting military conflict between states.

Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1080/03050621003784911

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