Relative Rebel Strength and Power Sharing in Intrastate Conflicts

Stephen E. Gent

International Interactions, 2011, vol. 37, issue 2, 215-228

Abstract: According to bargaining theory, one would expect that governments in intrastate conflicts will only be willing to concede to power sharing agreements when they face relatively strong rebel groups. Previous empirical studies have not found support for this hypothesis because they have not operationalized the capability of civil war combatants in relative terms. I show that once one uses a relative measure of capability, one finds that power sharing is more likely as the strength of a rebel group increases. Additionally, the analysis indicates that the relationship between rebel strength and power sharing is stronger for political power sharing than for territorial or military power sharing.

Date: 2011
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2011.569239

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