 Domestic Institutions, Capacity Limitations, and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987--2007Nathan W. Freeman International Interactions, 2013, vol. 39, issue 1, 54-78 Abstract: The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest. Date: 2013 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:39:y:2013:i:1:p:54-78 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2013.751296 Access Statistics for this article International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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