Reputations, Perceptions, and International Economic Agreements

Julia Gray and Raymond P. Hicks

International Interactions, 2014, vol. 40, issue 3, 325-349

Abstract: How do countries’ actions on the international stage affect their reputations? We propose that, particularly when evaluating countries about whom individuals may have few prior beliefs, international agreements may hold particular sway in establishing countries’ reputations. Specifically, if a relatively unknown country joins an organization with a country that has a good reputation, individuals will judge that original state to be less risky; if the better-known countries are generally perceived to have a bad reputation, the less-known state will also look more risky. This article presents evidence from a survey experiment in which individuals are asked about the weight of various factors in their perceptions of countries’ reputations. Subjects would randomly receive a prompt about a country’s domestic policy reform or its ties to other countries via economic or cultural agreements. The results show that states’ international ties play a role in assessments about country reputations. We also examine possible mechanisms underlying this finding. Lower risk associated with agreements with good countries is largely a function of anticipated economic benefits. However, the higher risk associated with agreements with bad countries seems to be more a function of anticipated political closeness between countries.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.899227

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