Threats at Home, Threats Abroad: Bargaining and War in the Shadow of Coups and Revolutions

Scott Wolford

International Interactions, 2014, vol. 40, issue 4, 506-532

Abstract: I analyze a two-level game in which a leader bargains over the spoils of international bargaining with a domestic opposition that can threaten her with a coup or revolution. While fighting an international war shrinks the domestic pie, it also alters the distribution of domestic power. This has three main implications. First, if war will undermine the opposition, fighting may be so attractive that leaders demand more for peace than foreign states are willing to give, leading to war. Second, if war will bolster the opposition, leaders accept harsh terms to avoid fighting—strategic selection that has implications for the observed relationship between war and political survival. Finally, prospective shifts in the distribution of domestic power caused by war can reduce the effects of international asymmetric information, though the result may be to increase or decrease the chances of war.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.891996

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