Coercion and the Global Spread of Securities Regulation

Johannes Kleibl

International Interactions, 2015, vol. 41, issue 1, 1-25

Abstract: Securities laws, overseen by independent regulatory agencies, have spread around the world. This article argues that coercion has played a more critical role in the spread of regulatory models than previously acknowledged. In particular, I argue that globally integrated markets can provide powerful regulators and governments with strong incentives to actively promote the export of their regulatory models. Case study evidence and the analysis of a global data set on the establishment of US-style securities regulatory regimes between 1973 and 2007 lend support to the crucial role of the US government and the US Securities and Exchange Commission in spreading the US securities regulatory model around the world.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.932785

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