The Impact of Institutional Coup-Proofing on Coup Attempts and Coup Outcomes

Tobias Böhmelt and Ulrich Pilster

International Interactions, 2015, vol. 41, issue 1, 158-182

Abstract: Coup-proofing pertains to political leaders’ strategies that will prevent groups inside or outside the state apparatus from seizing power via a coup d’état. One particular form of these strategies divides a country’s military into rivaling organizations, thereby creating an artificial balance between and structural obstacles for the armed forces. Despite the general claim that this institutional coup-proofing is indeed effective, a recent empirical study does not obtain evidence for a negative impact on the risk of coup attempts or coup outcomes. The authors take this finding as a motivation for their re-evaluation of the effect of institutional coup-proofing on coup risk and outcomes. By developing an argument that rests on the concepts of collective action and polarization, it is contended that institutional coup-proofing and coups are characterized by a U-shaped relationship: Institutional coup-proofing is likely to lower the likelihood of coup onsets and successful outcomes, yet only until a tipping point of about two equally strong military organizations. After this turning point, the risk of coup onset as well as coup success may increase again. Using time-series cross-section data for 1975--1999, the authors find strong and robust support for their claims in terms of coup onset, but not coup outcomes.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2014.906411

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