You’ve Got to Know When to Fold ‘Em: International and Domestic Consequences of Capitulation, 1919--1999

Ross A. Miller

International Interactions, 2015, vol. 41, issue 4, 674-698

Abstract: This article explores the effect of acquiescing to compellent threats on the probability that a leader loses office and on the probability that he or she is targeted in a subsequent international crisis. Using a leader-specific punishment (LSP) model that corrects for the endogeneity between domestic and international politics, an analysis of over 9,000 observations during the period 1919--1999 suggests that backing down generally increases both the risk of becoming a target and the probability of losing office. Leaders who back down to coercive threats without a fight are almost twice as likely to become targets in subsequent crises and much more likely to lose office than those who do not. Democratic leaders are more at risk than their autocratic counterparts for loss of office and becoming targets if they acquiesce to coercive threats.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:41:y:2015:i:4:p:674-698

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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1023435

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