Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence

T. Clifton Morgan

International Interactions, 2015, vol. 41, issue 4, 744-754

Abstract: Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, some unpublished, that are hard to reconcile with existing theory, and I argue that there is enough consistency in these results to suggest which way to turn.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2015.1037710

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