Kantian Dynamics Revisited: Time-Varying Analyses of Dyadic IGO-Conflict Relationships

Christopher C. Anderson, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Emily U. Schilling

International Interactions, 2016, vol. 42, issue 4, 644-676

Abstract: The literature on international organizations (IGOs) and interstate conflict in world politics produces a series of contradictory theoretical arguments and empirical findings about how IGOs help to prevent conflict and promote peace between member states. Empirical studies find a range of inconsistent results, ranging from pacifying effects of shared IGO memberships on dyadic militarized disputes to conflict-inducing effects of shared IGO memberships to null relationships. Theoretically, we consider how IGOs promote the rule of peace preservation through the mechanisms of coercion, self-interest, and legitimacy, and we describe how these mechanisms help explain the time-varying relationships between shared IGOs memberships and militarized conflict since WWII. Analyses of time-varying parameter models of dyad-year data from 1948 to 2000 suggest that shared IGO memberships reduce the likelihood of militarized conflict in some historical periods (Cold War) but increase the chances for dyadic conflict in other periods (post-Cold War). The design of IGOs is relevant as well, with security-based, highly institutionalized IGOs best suited to prevent militarized conflict between member states. The results suggest that evolutionary dynamics in the Kantian peace vary across legs of the Kantian tripod and that we cannot understand the Kantian peace without considering dynamic relationships over time.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2016.1185714

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