Labor migration numbers and rights: do they trade off or advance together?
David H. Bearce and
Andrew F. Hart
International Interactions, 2019, vol. 45, issue 1, 28-53
Abstract:
This article reconsiders the argument that as labor immigration policy opens, it must also become more restrictive in terms of immigrant rights. After discussing this tradeoff logic, positing a negative relationship between external (numbers) and internal (rights) labor migration policy, it then extends the underlying political model to show that when accounting for the lobbying pressure of firms seeking high skill labor, a very different expectation emerges. This political accommodation argument predicts a positive relationship between external and internal migration policy, or that policy related to labor immigration openness and immigrant rights should advance together, although not necessarily quickly or at the same rate. It then tests these competing propositions using a new dataset that sorts labor migration policy changes among 38 advanced industrial democracies from 1995 to 2016 into these two dimensions, finding a significant positive relationship between them.
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:45:y:2019:i:1:p:28-53
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1525137
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