Security-Civil Liberties Trade-offs: International Cooperation in Extraordinary Rendition

Rebecca Cordell

International Interactions, 2019, vol. 45, issue 2, 369-400

Abstract: Following the launch of the WoT, the United States established a global rendition network that saw the transfer of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) terrorist suspects to secret detention sites across the world. Conventional accounts of foreign complicity show that 54 diverse countries were involved, including many established democracies. What determined more than a quarter of the world’s countries to participate in RDI operations during the post-9/11 period? Given the sensitive nature of cooperation required, I argue that the United States screened countries according to their preferences on security-civil liberties trade-offs. Countries with similar preferences to the United States on human rights were cheaper to buy off and would have required less persuasion to cooperate. This theory is consistent with the existing claim that cooperation is more likely between countries with similar preferences as both actors are better off when the partnership increases. I test this hypothesis on global data using UNGA voting data as a proxy for common interest and develop a spatial variable that models a country’s logistical utility during the transfer of a detainee based on its distance to a central rendition transit corridor between the United States and Afghanistan. The analysis provides robust empirical support for my theoretical argument.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1522307

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