Failed agreements and their impact on subsequent mediation onset and success in intrastate conflicts

Levke Aduda

International Interactions, 2019, vol. 45, issue 5, 893-916

Abstract: What impact do failed mediated agreements have on subsequent mediation onset and success? The question of mediation onset and success is undoubtedly important, given that mediation is one of the international community’s preferred conflict management tools, but its voluntary nature leaves room for the conflict parties to (dis)agree to talks and possible settlements. Existing research suggests that previous mediation outcomes can affect subsequent mediation efforts positively or negatively – depending on the outcome in focus. This article argues that failed agreements – an outcome of mediation that has not been accounted for in existing literature – underscore the persistence of the commitment problem, and therefore the hazards of sharing private information. Consequently, the conflict parties question the utility of mediation, and the likelihood of subsequent mediation onset decreases. If subsequent talks take place despite the failed agreement, the conflict parties refrain from sharing private information, and reaching an agreement becomes thus less likely. Drawing on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s (UCDP) Managing Intrastate Conflict in Africa data set and the UCDP Peace Agreement data set, the results strongly underline the negative impact failed agreements have on subsequent mediation onset, and thereby show that agreement longevity is crucial not only for peace duration but also for leaving the door open to subsequent talks.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2019.1642201

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