Willful ignorance in international coercion

David Lindsey

International Interactions, 2021, vol. 47, issue 2, 291-317

Abstract: Intelligence gathering presents a dilemma when states attempt military coercion. New information may bolster the case for war and the credibility of threats to fight. But it may also undermine the case for war, thereby preventing states from achieving their aims through coercive threats. I argue that this incentivizes leaders to decline to gather available information about the state of the world when they hold threats to fight that are initially credible. Leaders who engage in such willful ignorance may blunder into war, but they can also achieve “coercion through ignorance,” forcing their opponents to make otherwise unavailable concessions. When conditions appear favorable initially, this tradeoff favors ignorance. I apply the model to the US invasion of Iraq, arguing that the Bush administration deliberately declined to gather relevant information as part of a strategy of coercion aimed at Saddam Hussein’s removal from power short of war.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1824996

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