EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Combatant rank and socialization to norms of restraint: examining the Australian and Philippine armies

Andrew M. Bell and Fiona Terry

International Interactions, 2021, vol. 47, issue 5, 825-854

Abstract: How does combatant rank influence the adoption of international humanitarian law (IHL) norms—or “norms of restraint”—within military organizations? To date, few political science studies have directly examined the impact of rank in influencing combatant socialization to norms of restraint. Such a gap in the literature is striking: rank is perhaps one of the most fundamentally important characteristics that shapes combatant identity. This study helps to fill this gap by examining combatant rank and the transmission and adoption of norms of restraint in military organizations. To do so, it conducts the first known comparative research study exploiting original survey and interview data from two state armed forces—the Australian Army and the Philippine Army. Research results show that under some conditions combatant rank can significantly influence the norm socialization process. Data further suggest that the adoption of such norms may be linked to the nature of command relationships within the military: the relative influence possessed by senior officers and junior enlisted members may affect the degree to which official norms are transmitted to enlisted combatants. Finally, data reveal the potentially problematic paradox of rank: the noncommissioned officers (NCOs) most influential for junior enlisted soldiers may themselves be more resistant to norms of restraint than senior officers operating at higher levels of command. Such data provide noteworthy new data enhancing our understanding of rank, military culture, and combatant socialization to norms of restraint.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/03050629.2021.1881085 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:825-854

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/GINI20

DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2021.1881085

Access Statistics for this article

International Interactions is currently edited by Michael Colaresi and Gerald Schneider

More articles in International Interactions from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:taf:ginixx:v:47:y:2021:i:5:p:825-854