Oil discovery, oil production, and coups d’état

Hans-Inge Langø, Curtis M. Bell and Scott Wolford

International Interactions, 2022, vol. 48, issue 3, 374-396

Abstract: We analyze a model of bargaining in the shadow of coups d’état in which oil rents increase the value of capturing the state but also allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth has already been realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before the government can use oil wealth to shift the distribution of power decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are also likely to fail. We uncover these relationships in an empirical analysis of oil production, oil discovery, coup attempts, and coup outcomes in a global sample of states from 1980 to 2010.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/03050629.2022.2061968

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